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The current regime in Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism and redesigned 
the country along ethnic lines as soon as it took political power in 1991. 
The aim of this article is to examine the prevalence of ethnic conf lict in 
Ethiopia and to evaluate the potential causes of the conf licts that followed 
in the past twenty-five years. There are competing claims, for and against 
federalism. And though it may be accurate to state that the founding 
principles of federalism have few ideological shortcomings, it may be that 
technicality issues (types and forms) may hamper the imposed federal 
system in Ethiopian. Thus, ethnic conf licts prevailing in Ethiopia may be 
caused by such technicality problems and the ethnic federal arrangement 
in Ethiopia needs an urgent reconsideration before the case moves to the 
worst scenario. 
Keywords: conf lict, ethnic, Ethiopia, federalism, EPRDF (Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), politics




Operational definition of ethnic conflict: Ethnic conf lict is a dispute 
between two or more ethnic/tribal groups caused by the politicisation of 
tribal identity by self-seeking politicians.
1. Introduction
Federalism as an ideology, like socialism, communism and liberalism, is a 
pragmatic term which refers to the sharing of power among autonomous 
units and is considered to advocate the values of ‘unity in diversity’ or 
‘shared rule and self-rule’ (Watts 2008:1) and to give regions some authority 
of their own. In his definition of federalism, Watts (2008:9) suggests that 
a federal system of government is one in which there is a division of power 
between one general and several regional authorities, each of which acts 
directly through his own administrative agencies. From a theoretical 
stand-point, the importance of a federal system, as shared by all political 
theories of federalism, is the sharing of power among regional states. 
This division of power may lead to the extinction of tyrannical regimes. 
The other reason why a federal form of government is chosen over a 
unitary form is to accommodate divergent local interests that cannot bear 
centralised rule (Alemante 2003:85). Owing to this, a federal system of 
government as a solution was high on the agenda during the early phase 
of post-colonial politics in Africa as a potential way to reconcile unity and 
diversity. Unfortunately, such attempts ended up being rather short-lived 
experiments (Erk 2014). Those countries which employed federal systems 
for a short while and then curtailed them were Congo (1960–1965), Kenya 
(1963–1965), Uganda (1962–1966), Mali (1959), and Cameroon (1961–1972). 
Federalism's track record as a source of instability and secession might well 
counsel against choosing this form of government for Sub-Saharan African 
states (Alemante 2003:85). Considering the negative experiences, a number 
of African countries have ignored a federal system of government. This is 
because the socio-cultural set-up of the African states is so hybrid in terms 
of identity, language and religion that the existing social realities might not 
entertain the federal model. The most striking feature of African identities 
and communities was their f luidity, heterogeneity and hybridity; a social 
43
Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia
world of multiple, overlapping and alternate identities with significant 
movement of peoples, intermingling of communities and cultural and 
linguistic borrowing (Berman 2010:2).
Notwithstanding such scepticism, three countries in Africa (Ethiopia, 
South Africa and Nigeria) have chosen a federal form of government so 
as to accommodate ethnic diversity. But there are significant degrees of 
difference in the ways ethnic power is allocated and used in the three 
federal governments of Africa. The Nigerian federal structure is to give 
legitimacy to territory over ethnicity by distributing the core population of 
each ethnic group in several states and thus Nigeria's federal structure helps 
avoid the crystallisation of ethnic identity around a particular territory 
(Alemante 2003:100). The South African constitution-makers rejected the 
claims of certain ethnic groups to self-governing status on the basis of their 
distinctive ethnic identity, whereas the organisation of the Ethiopian state 
is founded upon ethnic federalism, which uses ethnic groups as units of 
self-government (Alemante 2003:78). 
Seen from the perspectives of South Africa’s and Nigeria’s federal structures, 
Ethiopia’s federal arrangement is highly ethnocentric. Implementing the 
federal system of government on the idea of ethno-nationalism, as shown 
in Ethiopia, could worsen matters. To put the idea more precisely, ethno-
nationalism, a belief claiming the distinctiveness of a particular people 
and their right to self-rule in their homeland, will exacerbate community 
clashes into clashes of tribalism. Therefore, in order to defend a non-ethnic 
federal system and to promote the welfare of the society, federal states 
formulate a number of policies. For example, the territorial structure of 
Swiss federalism discourages the development of ethno-nationalism across 
language community lines (Alemante 2003:101). Similarly, the Ghanaian 
Constitution (Article 55:4) strictly prohibits any political party organised 
on the basis of ethnic identity. Furthering the discussion, Alemante 
suggested that federalism, even when it is not coupled with ethnicity, has 
generally not had a distinguished record as a stable form of government, and 
referred to the fact that even a ‘philosophically and legally’ sophisticated 
44
Bekalu Atnafu Taye
federal system – that of the United States – has not been spared the tragedy 
of a costly civil war due to separatist demands (Alemante 2003:85).
Despite the presence of many good ideas and sound principles in the 
ideology of federalism, there are considerable dangers involved in accepting 
the idea of federalism in the African context. Here, it should be noted that 
federalism is not the only factor that influences conflict; there are also a 
number of perceptible modalities that should be taken into account along 
with federalism such as the nature of federalism (such as territorial, multi-
national and ethnic), the forms of federalism (symmetric or asymmetric/
congruent or incongruent), the socio-cultural set-up of the society, the 
degree of autonomy (given for sub-national government), the gravity of the 
regime’s totalitarian institutional structures, and the like. Under the banner 
of federalism, the aforementioned factors are easily manipulated by African 
leaders for their own advantage, and in so doing they spoil the ideological 
foundations of the concept. The politicisation of African states changed to 
political ethnicisation as African leaders maneuvered to inherit power (Ake 
1993:3). Ethnicity itself (or our natural difference) cannot be a source of 
conflict. Rather the forms of the federal structure (when ethnic) coupled with 
the politicisation of tribal identity cause such problems. This will receive 
more detailed discussion in section four which deals with inappropriate 
applications of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.
In light of this, the main objective of this article is to show the level of ethnic 
conflicts caused by the politicisation of tribal identity in Ethiopia. This article 
is organised in the following sections. Section two gives a brief description 
of the historical background and the nature of the current political system 
in Ethiopia. Under this section, I want to portray background information 
about Ethiopia and explain how the current government of Ethiopia came 
to power. Section three deals with ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and section 
four is about conflict-promoting applications of federalism. The last section, 
section five, presents the conclusion and recommendations. Despite some 
human rights reports on ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, no one has made an 
inventory of ethnic conflicts according to technicality problems of ethnic 
federal arrangement in Ethiopia. Thus, analysing such conflicts with more 
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rigour made available by the social sciences and modern contemporary 
approaches is necessary. The method used in the study is qualitative, and 
empirical data such as published documents, letters and reports compiled by 
human rights defenders and organisations are used. 
2. Historical background
Ethiopia is an ancient country with a number of peculiarities; some of which 
are independence (free from colonialism), drought, poverty, and indigenous 
scripts. Despite being Africa’s oldest independent country, Ethiopia is one of 
Africa’s poorest states, better known for its periodic droughts, famines, and 
intermittent civil conflicts.
With regard to modernisation, Emperor Tewodros was recognised as 
being the first to begin his modernisation in politics by trying to unify 
the fragmented polities of Ethiopia under the banner of ser’at (ordered 
governance). Considering the vision of Emperor Tewodros, Emperor Menelik 
consolidated imperial authority, defended Ethiopian independence, and 
began the process of creating and supporting modern Ethiopia. Alemayehu 
(2014) stated that by securing Ethiopian independence and sovereignty, 
Menelik united Ethiopia and inaugurated the modern Ethiopian state from 
petty feuding kingdoms. Holding a similar view, Bahru (2002:60) noted that 
it was to be Menelik’s main claim to historical distinction that he presided 
over the realisation of an idea that had first been kindled in the fiery mind 
of Tewodros. 
The Ethiopia of today, not the ancient Abyssinia, was born as a result of 
internal power struggles between Menelik II and forces competing to control 
additional territories during the 19th century. In the process of territorial 
expansion, regional lords who surrendered themselves to Menelik II, were 
allowed to rule their areas by paying a certain amount of geber (tribute 
or tax) to the ruler of Shoa (central government). Southern rulers who 
peacefully submitted to Menelik II, such as the rulers of Jimma, Wollega, 
Bale, Benshangul and Assosa, were allowed to rule their territories by 
paying a fixed amount of tribute (Bahru 2002:87). One could take this as 
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a historical justification for a federal system since Ethiopians have lived for 
longer periods under decentralised forms of government (Assefa 2006:135). 
For most of its history, it existed as a de facto federal system in which the 
emperor exercised matters of national importance, while regional kingdoms 
had power to levy tax, guarantee local security and regulate trade. That is, 
the regional rulers had some degree of autonomy to govern their respective 
regions, which is the modern essence of federalism. Thus, the nineteenth 
century Ethiopian emperor, Menelik, operationalised the federal system of 
government that was geography-based, not ethnic. In the light of this, Mesfin 
(1999:142) stated that the structure of the traditional Ethiopian state was 
federal, having many kings (governing their own provinces) but one king 
of kings (ruling the whole state). Emperor Menelik II was credited for being 
the first to implement a federal system before the concept of federalism 
flourished in the Western political market.
In view of the above, during the imperial periods, a central issue in Ethiopian 
politics was the struggle between regional and central forces. For example, 
during the imperial era, the struggle was expressed through continuous 
disputes between the central king or emperor and the regional lords and 
princes (Bahru 2002:61). The former power struggles between the central and 
the regional rulers changed from a struggle for territorial expansion into a 
class struggle. And the 1974 Revolution which was provoked by the Ethiopian 
Student’s Movement was a national class struggle. It was not an ethnic 
conflict. During the revolution, a pool of educated elites, mostly Marxists in 
orientation, formed a number of political parties and intensified the growing 
wave of change. The twentieth century Ethiopian elites, participating in 
the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON) and the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), viewed the problems in Ethiopia as a result of 
class conflicts and not as an outcome of struggles between ethnic groups 
(Aalen 2002:4). 
Among the members of the students’ movement, however, the most ethnically 
conscious students were invariably the Tigrigna speakers (Young 2006:82). 
Owing to this, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leaders asserted 
that the early 20th century students’ movement was a struggle among ethnic 
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groups. In disagreement with the allegation of the TPLF leaders, however, a 
number of scholars teaching at the then Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) 
asserted that the reaction to the massive oppression and exploitation of the 
people of Ethiopia appeared to be a class struggle (Young 2006:81). According 
to Gebru, the peasants rebelled against the state not particularly because it 
was controlled and dominated by the Shoan Amhara, but primarily because 
it was oppressive (Gebru 1977:215). This movement did not have an ethnic 
foundation (Mesfin 2012); the main movement with ethnic-centred politics 
at the time was the one in Eritrea led by the Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF). 
It may therefore be said that the students targeting the ruling class were 
against human exploitation irrespective of the rulers’ ethnic background. 
Most student activists rejected the assertion that national divisions were 
designed to promote tribalism, and were comfortable with the regime's 
policy of avoiding references to ethnicity in any context (Young 2006:80). 
Not surprisingly, foreign professors teaching at HSIU at this time often noted 
the low level of ethnic consciousness of their students (Young 2006:81).
In spite of this general atmosphere, however, the Tigrigna speakers who were 
ethnically conscious began to spread their particular xenophobia, claiming 
that the alleged class struggle was actually ethnic. This was due to resentments 
and antagonisms they had against the then rulers whom they assumed to be 
Amhara. The Tigrayan nationalists saw the Amhara domination as the major 
reason behind the problems in Ethiopian society (Aalen 2002:38). But this 
seems to be a grand misinterpretation of Ethiopian history. First, it was not 
the Amhara hegemony that caused Ethiopia’s backwardness but rather the 
power monger rulers. 
Secondly, allegations of purely self-interested resource management 
seem to have been unjustly directed at the population of Amhara. But all 
Ethiopians or all provinces in the country suffered from lack of schools, 
industries, medical centres, other infrastructure and basic social services. 
Tigray was not exceptional. Lack of state investment in Tigray might 
have limited development, but there is little evidence that Tigray suffered 
disproportionately to other parts of non-Shoan Ethiopia in this respect 
(Young 2006:89). The corrupt feudal regime of Haile-Selassie and the 
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military junta of the Dergue were responsible for the mass oppression, and 
all ethnic groups were under the yoke of corruption and misrule. In both 
these cases, the leaders endorsed the validity of the statement that political 
leadership is a major culprit in the perennial conflict and competition over 
resources (Adejumobi 2007:139).
It was in in this context that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) 
appeared on the scene and was officially established in 1975. Their manifesto 
issued in 1976 called for the establishment of an independent republic of 
Tigray, but this was later modified to cultural and political autonomy for 
the region within a united Ethiopia (Aalen 2002:6). With the support of 
the popular mass, TPLF, along with its allies in the form of parties and/or 
movements, took power in 1991 and the most nationalist regime in modern 
Ethiopian history was removed from power. 
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is a set 
comprising four elements; namely, the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo 
People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and the South Ethiopian People’s 
Democratic Front (SEPDF). Despite the aforementioned alliance, however, 
TPLF alone dominated the Ethiopian political scenery and drafted and 
ratified a constitution in 1994 (Vestal 1999:84). In Ethiopia, political power 
is confined to and wielded by a very small circle, dominated by the TPLF – 
representing a minority group in the ruling coalition. 
The political culture of EPRDF is different; it is very secretive and stubborn. 
Reports of murder, ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing, public dissatisfaction, 
famine and similar problems cannot be brought to the media. The Ethiopian 
Broadcasting Corporation has not been allowed to entertain the idea that 
accounts of ethnic conflict are worth reporting. Government-controlled media 
closely reflected the views of the government and the ruling EPRDF (Human 
Rights Watch 2014a:12). The State-run Ethiopian Radio and Television has 
had the largest broadcast range in the country and the majority of Ethiopians 
do not have any alternative source of information, either from television, 
radio or any form of electronic media. The state-owned Ethio-Telecom is 
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the only internet service provider in the country. The government monitors 
telephone calls, text messages, and e-mails. Moreover, it jams foreign 
broadcasts and restricts access to the internet and blocks several websites. 
Any independent media agency has to avoid reporting on sensitive topics; 
otherwise, the agency would be accused of defamation or subversion charges. 
The TPLF-controlled Broadcasting Corporation does not have the real colour 
of a broadcasting agency; it has developed the habit of slaying truth with the 
swords of falsehood. Citing the International Telecommunication Union, 
Human Rights Watch (2014a:14) reported that approximately 1.9 percent of 
individuals used the internet in 2013 in a population of over ninety million. 
In this regard Amnesty International (2014/15:148) reported that the Media 
Law, Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) and Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation (ATP) limit freedom of expression and effective citizens’ 
participation in political activities. Furthering the discussion, Human Rights 
Watch (2014b:2) stated that unlike most other African countries, Ethiopia 
has a complete monopoly over its telecommunication sector through the 
state-owned operator, Ethio-Telecom. Despite low access, the government 
maintains a strict system of controls over digital media, making Ethiopia 
the only Sub-Saharan African to implement nationwide internet filtering 
(Freedom on the Net 2013:266). In view of this, under the present regime 
of EPRDF, Ethiopia has the third worst internet service in the world, after 
Somalia and Niger, and is the fourth worst jailer of journalists in the world 
and second worst in Africa (Alemayehu 2016). Seen from the Ethiopian 
government’s authoritarian policy perspective, being an honest journalist is 
terrorism, refusing to cooperate with the government is terrorism, and being 
conscious of events in general is terrorism. 
In view of the above, what is happening in one corner of the country cannot 
be known elsewhere, unless it is recorded and aired by international media 
agencies, human rights defenders or the Ethiopian Human Rights Council. It 
is in such a restricted scenario that the Ethiopian Human Rights Council has 
documented such reports (see the appendix). Therefore, these ethnic conflicts 
which have been documented by the Ethiopian Human Rights Council are a 
small selection from many. All of them could not be recorded by the Human 
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Rights Council due to the government’s restrictions on independent human 
rights activists, as well as due to financial and human resources constraints.
3. Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia
Apart from the conflicts stated in the appendix, illustrations provided by 
Human Rights Watch (2014a:20), Amnesty International (2014/15:148), 
Moresh Wegenie Amhara Organisation (2016), and the Human Rights 
Council (1992–2015) stated that there were a number of cases of ethnic 
tension and ethnic cleansing happening in the country. Fuelled by ethnic 
federalism or the politicisation of tribal identity, the regional government 
officials in the Oromia Regional State forcibly evicted about one hundred 
thousand ethnic Amhara from their homes. The majority of ethnic Amhara 
living in Western Harergie, Western Arsi, Arbagugu, Jimma, Guraferda, 
Wellega, Afar, Benshangul, and Western Shoa were displaced, killed or 
mistreated because of their ethnicity – which they never had a chance to 
choose before birth. According to these sources, the forced exclusion of 
people from their places of residence has been continuing (Human Rights 
Council 2015b:4b). 
As can be seen from the table in the attached appendix, there were 
documented conflicts which took place from 1997 to 2015. These were some 
of the disputes recorded by the Human Rights Council. The major recurring 
causes of the conflict were disagreements about the possession or use of land, 
grazing land or water resources, and about settlements, regional hegemony, 
access to State resources (funds, jobs, investments) and language policy in 
education and administration (Aalen 2002:70). Aalen (2002:70) also states 
that in the southern region there is a large potential for inter-ethnic struggles 
for regional hegemony because of the region’s ethnic heterogeneity, but that 
until now, conflicts over self-government and representation have taken 
place only at local level in the zones or woreda. Examples of such conflicts 
are the language issue in Wolaita in North Omo zone, the Silte’s request for 
independence from the rest of the Gurage zone and conflicts between Suri 
and Dizi pastoralist groups in South Omo zone. The western lowland regions 
of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella have both a majority consisting of two 
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major ethnic groups and a minority of several smaller ones. In Gambella, the 
Nuer and the Anwak have fought for regional hegemony. In Benishangul-
Gumuz, the Berta and the Gumuz, who together make up the majority of 
the population, have been at odds with each other. In both states, the two 
majority groups fought against each other for the control of the regional 
government (Aalen 2002:69). In Somali, the conflicts have been between 
different pastoralist clans of the Somali tribe. In Afar region, which is also a 
pastoralist and clan based society, the same problem has been experienced. 
The majority of conflicts in Ethiopia that are dubbed ‘ethnic’, are about land 
and the boundaries between territorialised ethnic groups (Abbink 2006:389). 
That is, the federal structure which is based on ethnicity contributes to 
ethnic tensions and conflicts, widening the disparities among the ethnic 
groups. Had it not been ethnic federalism, there could have been a symmetry 
model of federalism, with proportional territorial and population size in the 
various sub-regional states – which could have had the potential to reduce 
conflicts. Now, however, ethnic groups are competing with each other and 
several inter-ethnic conflicts have arisen across boundaries of regional states 
that are drawn along ethnic lines (Legesse 2015:2; Abbink 2006:390). Ethnic 
conflicts particularly led to injury, death and displacements of citizens in 
Afar, Gambella, Southern regional state, and Somali Regions (Human Rights 
Watch 2014a:20). In the present conditions, we contend that the post-1991 
regime in Ethiopia, despite its promise and claims to provide solutions, 
has been less successful than expected in managing ethnic tensions in the 
country, and has basically only ‘decentralised’ the problems by defining the 
sources of conflict as local, not national (Abbink 2006:390; Young 1999:329; 
Yohannes et al. 2005:10).
4. Conflict-promoting applications of federalism
The so-called ‘EPRDF government’ established a federal system focusing 
on ethnic identity after ratifying the new constitution in 1994 (Ethiopia 
1994). The ‘EPRDF’s constitution’ Article 47 (1) classifies the member states 
of the ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ into nine regional states 
(refer to appendix II). The indivisibility of the Ethiopian nation which has 
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been the result of thousands of years of interaction has been eroded and the 
stable ethnic composition has been disrupted by the introduction of ethnic 
federalism, so that Ethiopians are now at odds along ethnic lines. Legesse 
(2015:5) reckons that Ethiopian ethnic groups are rivals with each other 
since the institutionalisation of ethnicity in the early 1990s. Ethnicity which 
is driven by the politicisation of tribal identity has the tendency to cause 
problems. The critics of ethnic federalism note that the seed of tribalism 
which was a cause for ethnic conflict was sown with the coming into power 
of the EPRDF. 
Since the advent of ethnic federalism that politicised tribal identity, there 
have been a number of conflicts, cases of ethnic cleansing and unspeakable 
crimes committed against humanity in the country; and all these have taken 
place without fair responses from the ‘EPRDF/TPLF government’. Ethnic 
politics generates hostility amongst Ethiopia's different ethnic groups that 
hinders group interaction and entails ethnic conflicts. Due to the policy of 
the ruling party, mutual suspicion and hostility causing ethnic cleansing and 
conflict are bound to emerge even at the present time. What then are the 
conflict-promoting applications of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia? 
4.1 The politicisation of tribal identity (Ethnic federalism)
As stated above, ethnic conflict cannot be blamed on ethnicity, but rather 
on the politicisation of ethnic identity by self-seeking politicians. In light of 
this, of all the modalities of federalism (territorial, multi-national, ethnic, 
quasi-federal), ethnic federalism, with its politicising of ethnic identity, is 
obviously the one that can cause inter-ethnic problems. Research studies also 
show that if ethnic differences are high and politicised and if ‘federal bargain’ 
type solutions are difficult to achieve, then decentralisation may result in 
greater ethnic mobilisation and may lead to secession (Abbasi 2010:13). 
In ethnically polarised countries, ethnic group loyalty induces citizens to vote 
for their ethnic party, which increases ethnic grievance and the probability 
of civil war (Valfort 2007:5). As can be seen from the table in the attached 
appendix, there have been a number of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia since the 
introduction of ethnic federalism. For instance, due to government-spurred 
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divisiveness, the two tribes (Guji and Borena Oromo) that have historically 
managed to peacefully alternate control of their own  region, have clashed due 
to the fact that the ‘EPRDF government’ has allegedly been inciting leaders 
of the subgroups (Holder et al. 2006:23). These scholars further state that 
the current situation in Ethiopia presents dangers that could affect all ethnic 
groups in the future (Holder et al. 2006:10). That is, the federal system of 
government with the politicisation of tribal identity could cause deep ethnic 
division that brings multiple problems such as secessionist movements and 
a culture of mistrust. 
As noted in the foregoing paragraph, the ‘EPRDF’s constitution’ Article 
47 (1) classifies the member states of the ‘Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia’ as nine regional states and divided Ethiopians along ethnic 
lines thus institutionalising their divisions. Furthermore, the constitution 
itself has the potential to invite conf lict as in the case of self-determinism. 
Article 39 (1) of the Federal Constitution states: ‘Every Nation, Nationality 
and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, 
including the right to secession’. Considering article 39 (1), Aalen 
(2002:59) states that this is clearly a constitutional anomaly, and does 
not have any parallels in other federal systems today. A government that 
is concerned with the wellbeing of a nation does not constitutionally 
encourage ethnically grouped people to set apart from the whole nation. 
Taking this article into account, some groups, such as the Oromo People 
Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), 
have fought against the federal government claiming the right to self-
determination up to secession. Amnesty International (2014/15:151) points 
out that armed opposition groups remained in several parts of the country 
or in neighbouring countries although in most cases with small numbers 
of fighters and low levels of activity. 
Article 39 (1) of the Federal Constitution has the potential to create lasting 
conflict, distrust and hatred among ethnic groups today. Vestal (1999:165) 
notes that mistrust and hatred among ethnic groups grow out of the EPRDF's 
theory of governance. The ‘EPRDF government’ has sought to govern by 
playing upon animosities between Ethiopia's different ethnic groups (Vestal 
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1999:184). Citing the conflicts between the Dizi and Suri ethnic groups, 
the Oakland Institute’s field research (2014:16) indicates that the Ethiopian 
government is manipulating existing tensions between and among groups. 
The Human Rights Council (2015a:7) in its press release states that in 
every ethnic conflict, the hidden hands of governmental officials have been 
observed as trying to get political and economic advantages. It was not 
only the central policy of ethnic federalism that exacerbated tensions and 
conflicts, but decentralised ethnic-based administrations were also sowing 
seeds of ethnic awareness and antagonism. In other words, ethnic politics 
is able to divide the society, and ethnic groups are likely to develop mistrust 
against one another. In this regard, Turton (2006:14) argues that the federal 
‘remapping’ of Ethiopia along ethnic lines, by imposing a fixed ethno-
territorial grid on population with a long history of mobility and internal 
migration, has led to an increase rather than decrease of inter-ethnic conflict. 
To get rid of challenges related to ethnicity, countries tend to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, to provide individuals with equal 
rights regardless of their ethnic identity (Alemante 2003:73), and to strictly 
ban ethnic politics or parties. For example, the multi-national western 
federations (such as Switzerland and Canada) do not support ethnicity as 
the chief instrument of state organisation. Even in African countries, such 
as Uganda and Eritrea, tribal or religious parties are discouraged (Mesfin 
1999:157). The Ghanaian Constitution, Article 55 (4), prohibits tribal or 
ethnic-based political parties and it clearly states ‘Every political party 
shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based on 
ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions’. Contrary to this, 
the EPRDF Constitution, Article 46 (2), encourages ethnicity and tribal 
affiliation, and blatantly declares: ‘States shall be structured on the basis of 
settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people’. Ethiopia 
and Ghana are multi-ethnic societies with ethnic inequalities and historical 
rivalries but in Ethiopia, ethnic politics are the foundation and the lifeline 
of the TPLF which requires states to be structured as homogeneous tribal 
homelands, in much the same way as the Bantustans of apartheid South 
Africa (Alemayehu 2015). Even during elections, Ghanaian candidates are 
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required to get a minimum level of support in all regions of the country 
(Alemayehu 2015) but the Ethiopian government has been committed to 
perpetuating ethnic distinctiveness and political parties organised along 
ethnic lines. Accordingly, about sixty ethnically organised parties are found 
in the Ethiopian political landscape. 
In view of the above, a non-ethnic, non-tribal multi-party democracy is 
the only viable option that could guarantee stability, equity and economic 
development. This can be learnt from comparing Ghana and Ethiopia which 
are, respectively, democratic and developed, and undemocratic and poor. 
4.2 The design of the federal States
The design of federal units and administrative structures, whether symmetric 
or asymmetric, may cause problems and conflict. As observed by Aalen 
(2002:66), as well as Yohannes and others (2005:34), the delimitation of the 
federal units in Ethiopia has not only created very dissimilar constituent 
parts and an asymmetrical federal system, but also many regional states with 
ethnic heterogeneity within their borders, and several states in which the 
competition between ethnic groups or clans for regional hegemony has led 
to destabilisation and weakening of the regional governments. In symmetric 
federal arrangements, all federal units have the same powers and the same 
number of representatives in a second chamber of parliament but in the case 
of asymmetric federation, all federal units do not have the same powers. 
For example, Ethiopia and Russia which employ high levels of incongruent 
and asymmetric federalism, respectively, have experienced moderate-
to-high levels of conflict since adopting their most recent constitutional 
arrangements (Lancaster 2012:60). Under symmetric federalism, sub-
regional states are treated as equals as in the case of the United States but 
in asymmetric federalism, sub-national governments are treated differently, 
such as in Russia where each ethnic republic has its own president, whereas 
the Oblasts and the Krai have appointed governors (Lancaster 2012:7). 
A completely congruent system is one in which no federal subunit has a 
distinct social or cultural identity. For example, Australia would be a case 
in hand for a completely congruent federation, despite the fact that the 
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Northern Territory has the highest proportion of indigenous Australians in 
any Australian state; on the other hand, the Ethiopian and Belgian examples 
represent nearly completely incongruent federalism, with the boundaries 
for those states drawn up on ethno-linguistic lines (Lancaster 2012:24). The 
principles behind asymmetric federalism’s potential to mitigate civil conflict 
in a state are similar to those of incongruent federalism (Lancaster 2012:22). 
Ethiopia and Russia are somewhat similar in their designs of provincial units 
with Ethiopia a nearly incongruent federation featuring ethnically based 
subunits while Russia has extensive asymmetry with a nontrivial amount 
of subunits given special status in relation to the other federal subjects and 
the central government. On the other hand Brazil demonstrates completely 
congruent and symmetric federalism. 
Along with their forms of federation, Ethiopia and Russia have experienced 
civil conflicts at various junctures but Brazil has so far been a peaceful and 
stable federal state. Citing the quantitative sections of the study, Lancaster 
(2012:41) has shown that both incongruence and asymmetry have statistically 
significant effects on increasing the likelihood of conflict onset and the 
severity of conflicts. Groups that are not recognised under incongruent or 
asymmetric federations may organise protests to try to gain a greater level 
of recognition constitutionally (Lancaster 2012:60). A case in point is the 
Sidama ethnic groups in Ethiopia having three million people and failing to 
get the status of a regional state whereas the Harari whose overall population 
is 185 000 has been accorded a regional state. In the 2006–07 Ethiopian fiscal 
years, the Harari region received approximately 90 million Ethiopian birr 
(ETB) (Lancaster 2012:46) but the Sidama Regional Zone got less since it did 
not have the regional status level. Inequitable distribution of wealth and poor 
fiscal management are said to cause problems in federalism. The troubles 
that these particular ethnic groups display show that incongruent and 
ethnic federalism can be a recipe for grievance and potentially for conflict 
if an ethnic group is not recognised as important enough by the federal 
government (Lancaster 2012:46). 
Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia does not consider the existing social reality 
of a society so intertwined that it is hard to draw a line between or among 
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the various ethnic groups. In the Ethiopian context, most ethnic groups 
could not inhabit territorially defined geographical areas. Pointing out the 
limitations of the federal system in Ethiopia, Assefa (2006:135) argues that a 
significant number of Ethiopians do not live in the places where the majority 
of the members of their ethnic group are to be found; they have moved, either 
voluntarily, in search of better opportunities, or by force, due to the Dergue’s 
resettlement and villagisation. 
4.3 Fiscal federalism
Another important issue that needs much attention is the way in which money 
is distributed from the federal government to various regional states. In 
federation, central governments distribute funds to sub-national governments 
and there is a need to have effective systems of revenue sharing between 
the central and regional governments that could increase the effectiveness 
of the federal system. In distributing funds to sub-national governments, 
the central government could use a variety of fiscal federal criteria such as: 
population size, level of poverty and revenue generation capacity (Lancaster 
2012:45). In Ethiopia, the powers of sub-national states are constitutionally 
protected, but in reality the forms of decentralisation are quite limited by 
fiscal, political and administrative centralism (Dickovick 2014). Due to 
the subjectivity of the parameters and the autocratic nature of the federal 
government, the fiscal federal funds are not distributed to the sub-regional 
governments in a genuinely fair way. Regional states in Ethiopia have alleged 
in the past that the EPRDF is mainly focused on disproportionately helping 
out the Tigray region (Lancaster 2012:45). Since the key federal government 
positions have been monopolised by one ethnic party, the TPLF of Tigray, 
there has never been a fair mechanism of allocating the finance. The balance 
of power clearly lies with the TPLF and the resulting inequalities give rise to 
situations of violent conflict. The management of the national resources does 
not serve the national objectives of realising genuine development, reducing 
poverty and increasing the standard of living. In the absence of an effective, 
transparent and accountable system, the federal government dominates the 
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process of fiscal distribution, which creates a sense of discontent among the 
various ethnic groups.
For the structures of fiscal federalism to function properly, there needs to be 
a fair and equitable distribution of financial resources between the central 
government and the states (regions). Where this does not happen, there 
will obviously be a strong potential for conflict. For instance, a great deal 
of dissatisfaction in the federal-provincial relationship in Pakistan has been 
observed around the distribution of financial resources (Abbasi 2010:36). In 
the Ethiopian context, regional states have a weak fiscal autonomy and they 
have to depend on the federal government’s allocation of funds, which is 
quite unbalanced (Lancaster 2012:45). 
4.4 Dominant-party governance
In a similar vein, dominant-party control along with an undemocratic 
nature of a given state could be another factor that could create conflict 
among ethnic groups. Both the EPRDF in Ethiopia and the ANC in South 
Africa have dominated elections since the advent of federalism in the 1990s, 
but South Africa is relatively democratic and Ethiopia authoritarian; South 
Africa has a relatively advanced economy, but Ethiopia does not (Dickovick 
2014). When the less secure People's Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria is 
also taken into account, it may be said that dominant-party governance holds 
across the range of regime types from a relatively democratic South Africa 
through the flawed democracy in Nigeria to the exclusionary authoritarian 
system in Ethiopia (Dickovick 2014). The Ethiopian federal structure appears 
to be that of one-party state governance, which is characterised by highly 
concentrated and centralised powers maintained by totalitarian institutions 
such as the military, other security organs and state-controlled mass media.
Despite the fact that the EPRDF has had a federal-like system in theory, the 
centralised power coupled with authoritarianism and undemocratic nature 
of the regime equates the government with the communist party of USSR. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia created 
a situation in which the effectiveness of constitutional federal structures 
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has been questioned. Some scholars have argued that democratic deficits 
in communist countries as well as federal systems, which were organised 
around national groups, promoted nationalist movements to their eventual 
fall as federations (Bunce 2004 cited in Abbasi 2010:7).
One of the most significant reasons for the formation of a federal government 
has been to combat tyrant regimes by decentralising the powers of the 
government. But an attempt to mix Marxist ideology of one-party rule 
with federalism is believed to create contradictory scenarios. The former 
indoctrinates centralisation of political power while the latter teaches 
decentralisation of power. As it is quite evident today in Ethiopia, the 
blending of two contradictory ideologies coupled with the modalities of the 
federal structures (such as ethnic federalism, asymmetric and incongruent 
forms of federalism, dominant-party governance) provide valid reasons for 
the prevailing ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.
An attempt has been made here above to give an overview of federalism, 
mainly focusing on its forms and types. In a nutshell, in a multi-national and 
multi-cultural country, federalism might be an effective method of bringing 
about political stability and order. However, inappropriate application 
of the principle in a specific context, such as that of an authoritarian and 
undemocratic government, may yield just the opposite results, which may 
contribute to ethnic clashes and conflicts, and to disintegration of national 
unity.
5. Conclusion and recommendations
Entertaining ethnic diversity in multi-lingual and multi-cultural societies 
using federalism is a bone of contention for most scholars in the area. Some 
scholars choose the federal system of government to accommodate ethnic 
diversity but many commentators have observed that a federal system of 
government is inherently fragile even without adding ethnicity into the mix 
(Alemante 2003:56). There is considerable evidence to suggest that ethnic 
federalism entails conflict since it politicises tribal identity and scholars 
soundly refute its applicability, especially in the Ethiopian context. When it 
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was introduced and developed, social critics and intellectuals have stated the 
negative consequences of ethnic federalism in the Ethiopian context since 
this nation is an ancient country having multi-cultural and multi-lingual 
societies that have been assimilated due to thousands of years of continuous 
interaction, intermarriage, trade, migration, and other social activities. But 
the ‘current government’ has imposed a federal structure and has politicised 
human diversity. 
Federalism, not ethnic, if appropriately applied, ‘might be an effective method 
of bringing about political stability and order’ but in the Ethiopian case, the 
politicisation of ethnic identity by self-seeking political leaders causes political 
instability. The desire of the self-seeking political leaders is manifested through 
the politicisation of tribal identity – in their design of the federal states, their 
fiscal federalism and their dominant-party system. All these (politicisation 
of tribal identity, design of the federal states, fiscal federalism and dominant-
party) cause ethnic conflict and anomaly in the country. 
To remedy this acute systemic illness, the ‘government’ has to stop politicising 
human diversity and the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia needs an 
urgent reconsideration. A non-ethnic, non-tribal multi-party democracy has 
to be established as the only viable option that could more effectively address 
the typical causes of conflict and guarantee stability, equity and economic 
development.  
Sources
Aalen, Lovise 2002. Ethnic federalism in a dominant party state: The Ethiopian experience 
1991–2000. Bergen, Michelsen Institute. 
Abbasi, Zubair 2010. Federalism, provincial autonomy and conflicts. Islamabad, Islamabad 
Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI).
Abbink, Jon 2006. Ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia: Some problems and 
prospects of ethno-regional federalism. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24 (3), 
pp. 389–414.
Adejumobi, Saheed 2007. The history of Ethiopia. London, Greenwood Press. 
Ake, Claude 1993. What is the problem of ethnicity in Africa? A keynote address at the 
Conference on Ethnicity, Society and Conflict, 14–16 September 1992 in Durban, University 
of Natal. 
61
Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia
Alemante, G. Selassie 2003. Ethnic federalism: Its promise and pitfalls for Africa. The Yale Journal 
of International Law, 28 (51), pp. 51–107. 
Alemayehu, G. Mariam 2014. Demonizing Ethiopian history. Ethiomedia News, 13 January. 
Available from: <http://www.ethiomedia.com/index.html> (An African-American news 
and views website) [Accessed 10 February 2015]. 
Alemayehu, G. Mariam 2015. Why can’t Ethiopia become like Ghana? Ethiomedia News, 
4 October. Available from: <http://www.ethiomedia.com/index.html> [Accessed 
8 October 2015]. 
Alemayehu, G. Mariam 2016. Obama is the snake oil salesman of human rights: Human Rights 
and the ‘Virtue-ization’ of Hypocrisy by Barack Obama. Available from: <http://almariam.
com/2016/05/27/human-rights-and-the-virtue-ization-of-hypocrisy-by-barack-obama/> 
[Accessed 9 September 2016]. 
Amnesty International 2014/15. The state of the world’s human rights report. Amnesty 
International Report 2014/15. Available from: <http://www.amnesty.org> [Accessed 
12 June 2016].
Assefa, Fiseha 2006. Theory versus practice in the implementation of Ethiopia’s ethnic 
federalism. In: Turton, David ed. Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian experience in comparative 
perspective. Oxford, James Currey. pp. 131–164.
Bahru, Zewde 2002. A history of modern Ethiopia: 1855–1991. Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa 
University Press.
Berman, Bruce 2010. Ethnicity and democracy in Africa. Tokyo, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency Research Institute.
Dickovick, Tyler  2014. Federalism in Africa: Origins, operation and (in)significance. Journal of 
African Affairs,  24 (5), pp. 553–570.
Erk, Jan 2014. Federalism and decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Five patterns of evolution. 
Journal of African Affairs, 24 (5), pp. 535–552.
Ethiopia 1994. Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Available 
from: <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et007en.pdf> [Accessed 
9 September 2015].
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (HRC) 1992–2015. Compiled Report on Human Rights from 
1992–2015. Addis Ababa, HRC.
Ethiopian Human Rights Council 2015a. The situation of Human Rights and Human Rights 
defenders in Ethiopia. Press Release, 30 June, p 7. 
Ethiopian Human Rights Council 2015b. Stop ethnic cleansing in Ethiopia. Press Release, 
16 November, p 4. 
Freedom on the Net 2013. A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media. Available from: 
<www.freedomhouse.org> [Accessed 10 June 2015].
Gebru, Tareke 1977. Rural protest in Ethiopia, 1941–1970: A study of three rebellions. Ph.D. 
dissertation, Syracuse University. 
62
Bekalu Atnafu Taye
Ghana 1992. The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. Available from: <https://www.
ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/republic/constitution> [Accessed 10 June 2015].
Holder, Christina, Zeba Huq, and Mary Catherine Ryan 2006. Early warning in Ethiopia: 
Analysis. Human Rights and Genocide Clinic Cardozo, School of Law.
Human Rights Watch 2014a. Country reports on human rights practices for 2014. Available 
from: <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2014humanrightsreport/index.htm> 
[Accessed 2 January 2015].
Human Rights Watch 2014b. They know everything we do: Telecom and Internet Surveillance in 
Ethiopia. Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/03/25/they-know-everything-
we-do/telecom-and-internet-surveillance-ethiopia> [Accessed 2 January 2015].
Lancaster, Ross 2012. Federalism and civil conflict: The missing link? M.A. thesis. University of 
North Texas. 
Legesse, Tigabu  2015. Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia: What lessons can other 
jurisdictions draw? Africa Journal of International and Comparative Law, 23 (3), 
pp. 462–475. 
Mesfin, Wolde-Mariam 1999. The Horn of Africa: Conflict and poverty. Addis Ababa, Commercial 
Printing Press. 
Mesfin, Wolde-Mariam 2012. The Horn of Africa: Prone to be a dangerous area. An Amharic 
version. Addis Ababa, Commercial Printing Press. 
Moresh Wegenie Amhara Organization 2016. The final report on ethnic cleansing done on 
Amhara ethnic group from 1991 to 2016. Available from: <www.moreshwegenie.org> 
[Accessed 12 March 2015]. 
Oakland Institute 2014. Engineering ethnic conflict: The toll of Ethiopia’s Plantation 
Development on the Suri people. Available from: <http://oaklandinstitute.org info@
oaklandinstitute.org> [Accessed 16 July 2015].
Turton, David 2006. Introduction. In: Turton, David ed. Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian 
experience in comparative perspective. Oxford, James Currey. pp. 1–31. 
Valfort, Marie-Anne 2007. Containing ethnic conflicts through ethical voting? Evidence from 
Ethiopia. Available from: <www.hicn.org> [Accessed 10 March 2008].
Vestal, Theodore 1999. Ethiopia: A post-cold war African State. Westport, Greenwood Publishing 
Group.
Watts, Ronald 2008. Comparing federal systems. London, McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Yohannes, Gebre Michael, Kassaye Hadgu and Zerihun Ambaye 2005. Addressing pastoralist 
conflict in Ethiopia. Africa Peace Forum, Ethiopian Pastoralist Research and Development 
Association. Inter Africa Group.
Young, John 1999. Along Ethiopia’s western frontier: Gambella and Benishangul in transition. 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37 (2), pp. 321–346.
Young, John 2006. Peasant revolution in Ethiopia. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
63
Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia
Appendix 1: List of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia from 
1997 to 2015 during the EPRDF regime
Note: This list is not complete but sums up the main incidents. 




Places of the conflict
Consequences of  
the conflict
Causes of the conflict
July  
1997
Between Guji Oromo and 
Gedion people
One hundred and forty 
people died and one 




based leadership (HRC, 35th 
special Issue, p. 133).
December 
1999 
Between Wolaita and 
Gamo ethnic groups
Many people died and a 
number of people were 
injured.
Ethnic-based leadership 




In Northern Shoa between 
Amhara and Oromo 
ethnic groups 
Many people died and a 
number of people were 
injured.
Ethnic-based leadership 




In Eastern Wollega, 
between Amhara and 
Oromo ethnic groups
Many people died and a 
number of people were 
injured and displaced.
Ethnic-based leadership 




In Eastern Wollega, 
between Amhara and 
Oromo ethnic groups
One hundred people were 
killed; four people were 
injured; ten thousand nine 
hundred Amhara were 
displaced.
Regional leaders decided 
to cleanse Amhara ethnic 
groups from the region 




In Gambela, between 
Agniwak and Nuwier
Sixty people were killed; 
forty one people were 
injured; eight thousand 
seven hundred and eighty 
people were displaced and 
eight districts were burnt 
and unknown number of 
people sank in Baro River 
and died.
Ethnic competition between 
Agniwak and Nuwier ethnic 
groups on administrative 




In SPNN, between Dizie 
and Surma ethnic groups
Thirty-one individuals were 
killed and five people were 
injured; one hundred and 
fifty-two residents were 
burnt; one hundred and 
sixty-six cattle were stolen.
Due to the politicization of 
ethnic identity (HRC, 59th 
special Issue, p. 24).
October 
2003
In SPNN, among Dizie, 
Manit and Surma ethnic 
groups
Forty-one individuals were 
killed; one thousand four 
hundred and eighty people 
were displaced.
Ethnic competition (HRC, 





In Western Hararga, in 
Meisa, Woreda between 
Oromo and Somalia 
ethnic group
Nineteen people died; 
twenty-one people were 
injured; thirty-four 




the two ethnic groups on 
regional hegemony (HRC, 
71st special Issue, p. 227).
December 
2003
In Gambela, between 
Agniwak and Nuwier
 Ninety-three people were 
killed; forty-two people 
were injured. 
Ethnic identity was 
politicised by the govern-
ment and there were 
competitions among 
ethnic groups on regional 




In Gambela, between 
Agniwak and Nuwier
Thirteen people died; 
twenty people were 
injured; one hundred and 
ninety three shops were 
robbed; six thousand 
families were displaced.
Competition between 
the two ethnic groups on 
regional hegemony (HRC, 
73rd special Issue, p. 248).
January 
2005
In Eastern Harerga, 
between Oromo and 
Somalia ethnic groups
Fourteen people died and 
ten people were injured; 
one thousand six hundred 
and twenty-eight people 
were displaced; sixty 
cattle, four donkeys and 
twenty-six camels were 
stolen.
Claims on ethnic 
boundary (HRC, 82nd 
special Issue, p. 443).
March 
2005
Between Guji and Gebra 
ethnic group
Twenty-four individuals 
died and ten were injured.
The adoption of ‘sons-
of-soil’ orientations by 
regional states (HRC, 87th 
special Issue, p. 514).
June 2005
Between Guji and Gebra 
ethnic groups
Sixteen people died; 
twenty-five people were 
injured; property esti-
mated to be fifty-four 
thousand two hundred 
and fifty-five birr were 
destroyed.
A claim to have boundary 
enlargement 




In Eastern Wollea, in 
Gidie Kirimu Woreda 
between Oromo and 
Amhara ethnic groups
Over one hundred people 
died and four people were 
injured.
Conflicts over ‘autoch-
thony’, literally being 
‘sons of the soil’, caused 
by the politicised men-
tality of the ‘so-called’ 
indigenous people (HRC, 
98th special Issue, p. 757). 
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February 
2007
In Oromia Regional 
State, Guji Zone, Bulie 
Hora Woreda, between 
Burji and Guji ethnic 
groups
Two people died; eight 
people were injured.
Claims on ethnic 
boundary (HRC, 111th 




One student was killed 
and five students injured; 
nineteen students 
were expelled from the 
University
Tribal identity has been 
politicised since EPRDF 
took power (HRC, 96th 
special Issue, p. 736).
Haromya University
Ten students were injured 
and thirty students 
were expelled from the 
University.
Tribal identity has been 
politicised since EPRDF 
took power (HRC, 96th 
special Issue, p. 738).
Jimma University
Around twenty students 
were jailed.
Tribal identity has been 
politicised since EPRDF 
took power (HRC, 96th 
special Issue, p. 741).
May 2008
In Benishangul, between 
Gumiz and Oromo 
ethnic groups
Over one hundred people 
died; twenty-five injured 
and over one thousand 
people were displaced.
A claim to have agricul-
tural areas (HRC, 110th 
special Issue, p. 82).
March 
2009
In Benishangul, between 
Gumiz and Oromo 
ethnic groups
Sixteen people died; 
twenty people were 
injured.
Claims on ethnic 
boundary (HRC, 27th 
regular Issue, part two, 
p. 173).
May 2015
In SPNN, among 
Hamer, Kara and 
Arbolie ethnic groups
Seven people were killed 
and nine were injured.
Boundary dispute on 
water and agricultural 
land resources (HRC, 
































Appendix 2: The nine regional states and the two 
chartered cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) of 











































































































Appendix 3: Administrative regions and zones of 
Ethiopia during the EPRDF regime
